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NTSB Issues Preliminary Report on Potomac River Mid-Air Collision


The preliminary findings reveal a concerning history of near-miss incidents around Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.

On Mar. 11, 2025, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released a preliminary report detailing the events leading up to the tragic mid-air collision occurred over the Potomac River near Washington, D.C., involving a U.S. Army Sikorsky UH-60L Black Hawk helicopter and a Bombardier CRJ700 regional jet flying as PSA Airlines Flight 5342. The accident resulted in the loss of all 67 individuals on board both aircraft, marking one of the deadliest aviation incidents in recent U.S. history.

According to the NTSB’s report, the sequence of events began at approximately 8:33 PM EST when the Black Hawk, operating under the radio callsign PAT25, requested clearance to navigate helicopter Routes 1 and 4 en route to Davison Army Airfield (DAA) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The helicopter was conducting a VFR (visual flight rule) mission for the pilot’s annual standardization evaluation, utilizing NVGs (Night Vision Goggles). The ATC controller at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) approved this request.

At 8:43 PM, PSA Airlines Flight 5342, operating as a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport (ICT) in Kansas to DCA, checked in with DCA tower while on the Mount Vernon visual approach to runway 1. The controller proposed a landing on runway 33, which the flight crew accepted. At this point, the Black Hawk was traveling south along the Potomac River, and the CRJ700 was approaching from the south.

At 8:46 PM, the controller informed PAT25 of the CRJ700’s position, noting that it was at 1,200 feet and circling to runway 33. The Black Hawk crew confirmed visual contact with the traffic and requested visual separation, which the controller approved. Subsequently, the controller cleared another jet for departure from runway 1 without delay.

As the Black Hawk continued southbound past Hains Point, a non-compulsory reporting point, the controller sought confirmation from PAT25 regarding the CRJ700’s position. A conflict alert sounded in the tower at this time. The controller instructed PAT25 to pass behind the CRJ700; the Black Hawk crew acknowledged, reaffirmed visual contact, and again requested visual separation, which was granted. It must be noted that the aircraft were not on the same radio frequency when the collision occurred:

Flight 5342 was communicating with the DCA tower controller via the published control tower frequency of 119.1 MHz; PAT25 was communicating with the tower controller via the published helicopter frequency of 134.35 MHz. Both frequencies utilized the very high frequency range. Because the aircraft were on different frequencies, the crews of flight 5342 and PAT25 were not able to hear each other’s transmissions to the controller, but the controller’s transmissions to each aircraft would be audible to both flight crews.

The collision, which was filmed from several different points of view, occurred at 8:47:59 PM, at an altitude of about 300 feet, as Flight 5342 was on final approach to runway 33.

NTSB’s Urgent Safety Recommendations

As a result of the January 2025 accident, the FAA issued Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) FDC 5/4379 on Feb. 19, 2025, which restricted helicopter traffic from operating over the Potomac River near DCA from the surface to 17,999 ft msl until March 31, 2025. The NOTAM states that if a lifesaving medical, active law enforcement, active air defense, or presidential transport helicopter mission must operate in this restricted area, civilian aircraft will not be allowed in the area to prevent potential conflicts.

Based on the initial findings, on the NTSB issued urgent safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), emphasizing the need to deconflict airplane and helicopter traffic in the vicinity of DCA. The board highlighted that the current practice, allowing helicopters and planes to be as close as 75 feet apart during landing, poses an unacceptable risk. The NTSB’s recommendations include:

  • Assessing helicopter Route 4 and its interaction with fixed-wing traffic, particularly during operations involving runway 33 arrivals and runway 15 departures.
  • Establishing procedures to ensure safe separation between helicopter and airplane traffic, potentially by designating alternative helicopter routes or holding patterns when certain runways are in use.

In particular:

Prohibit operations on helicopter Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when runways 15 and 33 are being used for departures and arrivals, respectively, at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. (A-25-1) (Urgent)

Designate an alternative helicopter route that can be used to facilitate travel between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when that segment of Route 4 is closed. (A-25-2) (Urgent)

Long history of near-misses

The NTSB’s preliminary findings also revealed a troubling history of near-miss incidents at DCA.

Review of information gathered from voluntary safety reporting programs along with FAA data regarding encounters between helicopters and commercial aircraft near DCA from 2011 through 2024 indicated that a vast majority of the reported events occurred on approach to landing. Initial analysis found that at least one TCAS resolution advisory (RA) was triggered per month due to proximity to a helicopter. In over half of these instances, the helicopter may have been above the route altitude restriction. Two-thirds of the events occurred at night.

A review of commercial operations (instrument flight rules departures or arrivals) at DCA between October 2021 and December 2024 indicated a total of 944,179 operations. During that time, there were 15,214 occurrences between commercial airplanes and helicopters in which there was a lateral separation distance of less than 1 nm and vertical separation of less than 400 ft. There were 85 recorded events that involved a lateral separation less than 1,500 ft and vertical separation less than 200 ft.

The data indicated that, between 2018 and 2024, runway 1 accounted for about 57% of arrivals, runway 19 accounted for about 38% of arrivals, runway 33 accounted for about 4% of arrivals, and runway 15 accounted for less than 1 percent of arrivals at DCA. Runway 15 accounted for about 5% of departures from DCA.

In other words, based on the data released, the Potomac River collision appears to have been an “accident waiting to happen”: as it always happens in aviation, it was the result of systemic risks that had been documented for years. With many close calls, helicopter altitude violations, frequent TCAS alerts, and nighttime risks, the conditions for a mid-air collision were present long before Jan. 29, 2025.





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